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CASE SETTING AND BASIS FOR REHEARING 
The Decision filed August 18, 1988 overlooked several critical 
facts and misapprehended those facts and the law that should be 
applied in this case. All of the individual Labrums whose 
property was affected by the Partial Summary Judgment, as well as 
their counsel, request rehearing. 
Counsel for the Petitioners/Appellants herein certifies this 
Petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
The Court *s Opinion centered solely on the issue of counsel 
for Appellants' alleged contempt of the Court Order signed March 
4, 1985. Discussion of points in the decision, including the 
facts, jurisdiction of the Trial Court, exempt property claimed by 
the Labrums, the Bankruptcy Court Stay Order, and contempt - - only 
deal with counsel's alleged breach of the Trial Court's Order. The 
Opinion overlooked many of the Trial Court's underlying procedural 
and legal errors that were also part of the appeal. 
The Notice of Appeal filed December 9, 1985 appealed as a 
matter of right to the question of contempt. It also appealed 
the Interlocutory Orders issued by Judge Christoffersen of April 
1, 1985, March 4, 1985, January 8, 1985, October 22, 1984, and 
September 13, 1984. These Orders were part of the appeal. They 
are referred to in the Docketing Statement in paragraph 3. 
Discussion in footnotes 4 and 5 (Appellants' Brief pages 7 and 3) 
refers to the understanding Appellants had from Justice Gordon Hall 
through Mr. Butler, the Clerk, that these issues would also be 
1 
considered by the Court. The Opinion does not address these 
matters. Since these were part of the setting before and after the 
February 8, 1985 hearing took place, they need to be addressed. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants consistently reminded the Trial Court of pleading 
limits and procedural requirements and rules. The Trial Court 
should have been protecting them in their property and procedural 
rights. Yet, the Opinion fails to recognize: (1) Labrums' claim 
for the return of their exempt property, and (2) Labrums' rights 
to limit the Partial Summary Judgment to the pleadings. Their 
defense of the yet undecided Second and Third Causes of Action in 
this lawsuit, as well as their Affirmative Defeases which have 
never been ruled on, are at risk because of this misapprehension. 
This Appeal was not of a final decision, but of some issues which 
were ready to be appealed. The Opinion discusses the Trial Court's 
ruling as if there are no other issues. There were, and they need 
to be addressed too. 
I . 
MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
WHICH SHOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE DECISION TO CAUSE 
THE COURT BELOW TO BE REVERSED. 
A. LABRUMS ALSO APPEALED. 
The Opinion says "Of the many issues raised by Malouf on 
appeal, only one is dispositive . . . " at the bottom of page 3. 
Opinions of this Court often rest on one critical issue. The 
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quoted language refers to the source of more issues: the real 
parties to this case, Labrums. Malouf is not the only Appellant* 
The Labrums are also Appellants. Labrums raised some very 
important points. This Court, the final interpreter of Rules of 
Procedure and Statutes in this State, focused its decision solely 
on the question of contempt, isolating it from the circumstances. 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS TO BE LIMITED TO PLEADINGS. 
The Court Opinion also overlooks the fact that the Summary 
Judgment entered against Labrums was only a Partial Summary 
Judgment . The Partial Summary Judgment that the Trial Court 
authorised P.C.A. to execute writs on and serve garnishments on 
conflicted with the First Cause of Action which the Partial Summary 
Judgment was to be limited to. If the Court dealt with this issue, 
raised in Appellants' Brief (pages 19 through 23) and Reply Brief 
(pages 7 through 22), it does not explain why the Trial Court was 
not exceeding proper limits in doing this for P.C.A. The First 
Cause of Action in the Complaint asked for a deficiency judgment, 
to be entered after a foreclosure sale. Instead, the Trial Court 
overlooked the limits of its own Partial Summary Judgment to allow 
both a money judgment and an execution (not a foreclosure) sale. 
There was never a foreclosure sale. It then allowed a writ of 
garnishment before there was a deficiency. The Trial Court did not 
adhere to P.C.A.'s pleadings or the Rules. If the Supreme Court 
justifies that kind of justice, as it did by not considering those 
issues in the Opinion, it encourages trial courts to re-write the 
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law based on political prejudices. That is not the quality of 
justice that should be available from either a trial court or a 
court of last resort• 
The Opinion overlooked the issues raised in Appellants' Brief 
about the insufficient proof for P.C.A.'s Partial Summary Judgment. 
It overlooked the fact that P.C.A. was required to make an 
accounting pursuant to the Memorandum Decision issued November 21, 
1984. (The decision was after the October 22, 1984 hearing. Record, 
pages 213 and 214) . 
The Partial Summary Judgment was only on the First Cause of 
Action. The First Cause of Action required that an accounting be 
made. No deficiency judgment was ever entered. There was never 
a verifiable correct amount for which either writs of execution or 
writs of garnishment were entered. The Supreme Court Opinion did 
not rationalize why these facts were not addressed in its Opinion. 
It should find that the Labrums' Constitutional rights to property 
were seriously violated by the Plaintiff and the Trial Court. 
C. THE GARNISHMENT WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE RULES. 
All the foregoing were raised by the Appeal, These issues 
relate to whether the Trial Court was considering a legal 
garnishment when the February 8, 1985 hearing took place. The 
Opinion overlooks a fundamental property right all debtors have in 
garnishments: A garnishment writ does not allow a creditor any 
access or control over exempt property. Rule 64D(e)(i) limits 
garnishment attachment to only non-exempt property. The writ can 
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only apply to non-exempt property • The writ should advise each 
garnishee: 
• • . that he is attached as garnishee in the 
action, and commanding him not to pay any debt 
due or to become due to the defendant which is 
not exempt from execution, and to retain 
possession and control of all credits, 
chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in 
action, money and personal property, and 
rights to property of such defendant not 
exempt from execution, until further order of 
the Court. CRule 64D(e)(i)] Emphasis Added. 
The whole reason there was a hearing February 8, 1985, was to 
determine whether that writ of garnishment was legally sufficient. 
The actual writ used by P.C.A. says nothing about exempt property. 
The February 8th ruling did not recognize that Labrums claimed the 
property to be exempt property. Yet, the writ and the ruling were 
all voidable for noncompliance with Rule 64D. The Plaintiff did 
not comply with it and neither did the Trial Court. This is a main 
reason the underlying order by Judge Christoffersen was not valid. 
D. UNDERLYING ORDER WAS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, AND BASED ON 
ANSWERS, HOLD FUNDS. 
The Opinion overlooks the fact that the February 8, 1985 
Ruling (to hold funds for the benefit of the Trustee) was actually 
stated by Judge Christoffersen to apply only to those funds which 
the answers to the garnishment questions showed Malouf was holding 
which should be turned over to the Labrums' Bankruptcy Trustee. 
The Court said it assumed that all property held by Malouf that 
belonged to the individual Labrums who filed bankruptcy would have 
to be turned over to the Trustee. The Judge repeated that belief 
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several times in the transcript of the February 8, 1985 hearing. 
See page 18, lines 21 through 25; page 19, lines 7 through 9; and 
page 25, lines 25 through page 26, line 2. The Court: 
• . . Yeah. It isn't against anybody, except 
answer the questions . . . I assume . . . if 
they're somebody that's filed bankruptcy, then 
they go the trustee . . . (page 18) . 
Well, it depends how you frame your questions 
. . . and then he answers it depending on his 
answers, if it's people who have filed 
bankruptcy then that's trustee money . . . to 
make a determination of what to do with it. 
I guess it depends on the results of his 
answers . . . (page 19) . 
. . . I assume, since the bankruptcies are 
filed, that they have the jurisdiction to make 
the determination of what happens to the 
assets anyway (page 25,26). 
In each instance, the Court "assumes" the Bankruptcy trustee has 
jurisdiction to decide the issue of who is ultimately entitled to 
the property. That assumption explains why the Order was made the 
way it was. The Court's assumption was in fact, wrong. Exempt 
property is not turned over to the trustee as a matter of course. 
If it is, the trustee has to properly ask for it in Bankruptcy 
Court. Usually, property claimed as exempt is retained by the 
debtor or a custodian. Otherwise, trustees would have alot of 
houses, cars, refrigerators, money, clothing and food they would 
just have to give back. This is consistent with the requirements 
of the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. Sections 541, 522(b) and 522(1) 
allowing property to be exempted from the bankruptcy estate. This 
was explained in Appellants' Brief pages 26 and 27, and the Reply 
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Brief on pages 22 and 23. In any event, the Court assumed that 
something should happen which in fact was not required by the law: 
that the exempt property would have to be turned over to the 
Trustee. 
E. PROPERTY STATUS STILL NOT FINAL. 
The Trial Court did not rule that the property Labrums claimed 
was exempt was property the Trustee could distribute to P.C.A. or 
other creditors. Neither the Trial Court nor the Opinion justify 
the right of the Trustee to hold exempt property under the facts, 
including the fact that the Trustee did not follow Bankruptcy Rule 
4003(b) or act within the time allowed by local Rule 25 to get the 
benefit of the February 8, 1985 ruling. Because this appeal is as 
much the Labrums' as it is Malouf *s, and since the Labrums are 
Appellants and parties, they have standing in the Trial Court and 
on appeal to assert that the property was exempt. The Trial Court 
never had a hearing on the question whether it was in fact exempt. 
No hearing was required either, inasmuch as it was claimed to be 
exempt. Under the Bankruptcy Rules just cited and argued in the 
Briefs, and since the claim was not contested, the property is 
exempt. The Trial Court ruling on February 8, 1985, did not say 
the property Labrums" counsel held for them was not exempt. 
Labrums' exemption claim in the bankruptcy Schedules and subsequent 
answers to the garnishment questions was sufficient, under 
Bankruptcy Rules and under U.R.C.P. 64D, to allow them to retain 
it, anywhere they wanted to. 
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F. THE OPINION SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED ACTUAL GARNISHMENT ANSWERS 
MADE. 
The Opinion overlooks the fact that on February 8, 1985, 
answers to the writ of garnishment were neither required nor given. 
The ruling was that answers be made later. Therefore, the 
statement of fact at the bottom of page two and the top of page 
three misconstrues the intent of the Court's words about answers 
to the questions: 
The Trial Court nevertheless denied a motion 
to dissolve a writ of garnishment and ordered 
Malout to answer the interrogatories 
accompanying the writ of garnishment. 
In light of the automatic bankrutpcy stay, the 
Court disallowed execution based on Malouf's 
answers at the conclusion of the February 8, 
hearing , but ordered Malouf to hold and safely 
keep any and all property in his possession 
belonging to the defendants herein for the 
benefit of the trustee appointed in the 
bankruptcy of said Defendants. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Court ruling was not based on answers to the garnishment. 
The Supreme Court Opinion wrongly grounds itself on the idea that 
answers to the garnishment justified the Trial Court ruling to hold 
the property. The Trial Court, we've already discovered, assumed 
that if the property belonged to someone who filed bankruptcy, then 
the trustee would be entitled to possession. That assumption has 
been shown to be only an assumption. The Opinion makes the 
mistake of granting credence to the same assumption that Judge 
Christoffersen erroneously made. The Trial Court's intent should 
be understood to mean that based on the answers to be given, the 
Court assumed the property would have to be held for the Trustee. 
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G. LABRUMS PROPERLY CLAIMED THEIR EXEMPTION. 
The Court did not want to rule on the question of who was 
entitled to the property Labrums claimed to be exempt. On page 19 
of the February 8, 1985 Transcript, the Judge said: 
. . . depending on his answers if it's people 
who have filed bankruptcy then that's 
trustee's money, (page 19, lines 8 and 9) 
This makes it clear the Court was leaving the ultimate question of 
who was entitled to the property up to the Trustee. This is one 
reason the Utah Supreme Court should discuss any justification it 
has for the failure of the Trustee to timely act. Under the 
Bankruptcy Court's own rules, the failure should foreclose the 
Trustee, P.C.A., and the Trial Court from control or claim for the 
funds Labrums' counsel held. Any Opinion should not overlook the 
fact that the bankruptcy filing February 5, 1985, preceded the 
February 8, 1985 hearing by three days. Labrums* Schedules were 
filed. The automatic stay was in effect. The Schedules disclosed 
the Labrums' claims for exempt property. The Labrums, not iust 
their counsel, alleged the money was exempt from the writ of 
garnishment, from any execution, and from the Bankruptcy Trustee. 
H. LABRUMS SHOULD KEEP THE MONEY. 
The Supreme Court has impliedly recognized Labrums' standing 
to raise their claim for the property's exemption on appeal by 
holding the Trial Court Order (for Malouf to "hold" the funds for 
the trustee) was valid. If the Opinion comments on that underlying 
ruling, it should review it thoroughly and more deeply than Judge 
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Wahlquist did. The main requirement of the ruling was to answer 
questions. The answers showed Labrums were entitled to keep the 
property. Labrums' right to the property should be reviewed. Only 
a Partial Summary Judgment was against them. No money judgment had 
been validly entered. Summary judgment was not entered against 
three Labrums who filed bankruptcy February 5, 1985. See page 7, 
Appeal Brief Mote 4. 
The Opinion refers to the fact that when ordered by the 
Bankruptcy Court to turn over the milk diversion funds, Malouf 
turned over $41,299.83. It implies the $5,360.12 that was not paid 
was milk diversion money. It was neither milk diversion nor rental 
income, and should not have had any bearing on the Bankruptcy Court 
Order. It is unfair to counsel and shows the Supreme Court 
misapprehended the true facts, when the Opinion suggests the 
$5,360.12 retained was also part of the milk diversion money. It 
was not. See page 23 of the Reply Brief. 
The Opinion does not explain away the fact that the Bankruptcy 
Trustee, for whose benefit the Order after February 8, 1985 was 
exclusively made, neither sought in Bankruptcy Court nor State 
Court to have the exemption claims of Labrums set aside, nor did 
he ever seek a ruling that he was entitled to the funds. He was 
time-barred from receiving the funds which Labrums claimed in their 
February 5, 1985 Schedules to be exempt property. The Trustee 
either forgot or he agreed with the exempt property claim. The 
Order requiring that the funds once held by Malouf be turned over 
to the Trustee was made in excess of the Trial Court *s 
10 
jurisdiction, because a prior equivalent order had not been made. 
This Court should uphold the integrity of the Utah Exemptions 
Act by reversing Judge Wahlquist 's Order that the Trustee was 
entitled to the 321,268.12. Labrums had claimed money still held 
by their counsel to be exempt property; and the Trustee's failure 
to exercise any rights he may have had became moot when he did not. 
It is simply incorrect law that the Trustee is always entitled to 
hold exempt property while he is deciding whether it is exempt or 
not. See page 12 of Labrums' Reply Brief. 
Neither the Trial Court nor the Opinion rationalized away the 
Act of Congress saying that milk diversion proceeds should not be 
available to creditors. Authority for this was raised in 
Appellants' Reply Brief, Addendums A-4, A-5 , A-6, and particularly 
A-7 (Point II) the Trustee could be presumed to have realized that 
milk diversion monies, claimed exempt by Labrums, should not 
ultimately be available for creditors and should not come into his 
hands. 
I. TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER EXEMPTION QUESTION. 
The Opinion minimizes the exempt property claims for the funds 
held by Malouf for Labrums. The Opinion says that the ultimate 
question of their exempt status was " . . . doubtful on this record. 
. ." (Page 5). But, that was not the issue before the Trial Court. 
It wasn't the issue because the Trial Court did not think Labrums 
property rights mattered because they had filed for bankruptcy. 
(See February 8, 1985 Transcript page 7, lines 16 through 18; page 
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8, line 12 through page 10, line 2; page 11, lines 4 through 9; 
page 11, line 20 through page 12, line 9; page ±2, line 10 through 
page 13, line 10; page 23, line 20 through page 25, line 13; and 
page 25, line 25. The point is that the Labrumis were entitled to 
claim the exemptions in the Bankruptcy Court, which they did. The 
Trial Court assumed the claim was either invalid or not allowed or 
would conflict with the Trustee. However, the claim was one 
Labrums were entitled to make, was supported by the Utah Exemption 
Act, Bankruptcy law, and the Act of Congress creating the milk 
diversion funds, and was not contested. These facts were known at 
the time the contempt hearing was held. The Trial Court should 
have granted Labrums the presumption that their claim for exempt 
property was valid. In their appeal, it is Labrums, and not just 
Malouf, that argue that funds were exempt. Labrums are the real 
Appellants in this whole matter. 
J. TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS BECAME MOOT. 
The Opinion misapprehends the length of time the Trustee had 
to act to get the benefit of Judge Christoffersen*s February 8, 
1985 Ruling. It assumes he had forever. Even if the Court assumes 
the ruling was valid (i.e. it was based on a proper summary 
judgment; entered against the right parties; was consistent with 
the First Cause of Action; was for a verifiably correct amount; and 
the garnishment being discussed at the hearing was valid — none 
of which points were discussed in the Opinion) , the Order did not 
allow the Trustee an indefinite period to act. When he finally did 
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act by a token joining at P.C.A.'s invitation in the Motion for 
Contempt, it was months after the time had passed for him to take 
any action. The Order only required Malouf to hold the funds for 
the benefit of the Trustee, and the Trustee did not act within the 
time he could get any benefit. The Trustee's waiver should at 
least be explained away by the Opinion. Why can he wait past the 
allowable time to act? What business did Judge Wahlquist have in 
ordering the Trustee to have the funds paid to him when Judge 
Christoffersen never got to that issue? The creditor was never 
held to be entitled to the funds. The underlying Order never did 
require the funds to be turned over to the Trustee. The Labrums* 
counsel needed only to hang on to them if the Trustee was entitled 
to them based on the answers to the garnishment. The Court's 
"assumption" (February 8, 1985 Transcript, pages 18, 23 and 25) 
that the assets would go to the Trustee in any event, was not part 
of the ruling. The transcript says at page 23, lines 7 through 10: 
Okay. So what you need now is an order 
requiring him t_o answer the writ . . . and 
that i_f_ there are any funds held b£ reason of 
the answers to the writ that they cannot be 
executed upon but must be held . . . for the 
benefit of the trustee, for decision as to 
what should happen to the funds, 
(.Emphasis Added) . 
Obviously, if the garnishment question answers showed the Trustee 
wasn't entitled to the funds, there would be no need to hold them 
for him for any period. That language does not say the Trustee 
gets the funds in all cases. The answers made legally took 
advantage of the language in U.R.C.P. Rule 64D, which excludes 
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exempt property from the effect of the writ. P.C.A's proper 
recourse was to attack the answers, not Labrums' attorney. The 
Opinion does not explain why the Supreme Court could uphold Judge 
Wahlquist's change to the Trial Court's original ruling to give 
property to the Trustee which he was never ordered or entitled to 
receive in the first place. 
The Opinion as written can only be supported if it assumes the 
Labrums are not appealing P.C.A.'s Partial Summary Judgment or the 
validity of the writ of garnishment. They are. Their presence or 
rights as Appellants was not explained away by the Opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Contempt exists only if there is disobedience of any lawful 
judgment. The question the Court should re-hear is whether the 
ruling on February 8, 1985 was lawful in light of the facts which 
have been misapprehended. The Labrums and their counsel could 
agree that as stated February 8th the ruling was lawful: Malouf 
had to answer the garnishment questions, and if those answers 
showed the Trustee was entitled to the property, he had to hold the 
property for the benefit of the Trustee. That was not the same as 
an order that the Trustee actually receive the funds. 
Where the funds were claimed to be exempt and the Trustee 
never acted to change Labrums' exemption claim and ran out of time 
to challenge the exemption claim long before this motion for 
contempt was brought, the underlying ruling should have been found 
to have been moot, unenforceable or void by the time Judge 
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Wahlquist heard the matter, if not much earlier. See Reply Brief, 
pages 26, 27, and Appellants1 Brief, pages 22 and 23. The Trustee 
had plenty of opportunity to act for his own benefit if he had 
wanted to. He did not. Contempt of Labrums * counsel is an 
inappropriate remedy. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of August, 1988. 
Raymond N. Malouf 
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